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Abstract
Breaking the uncovered interest rate parity (UIP) condition is essential to ac-
counting for the empirical behavior of exchange rates, and is a prerequisite for
theoretical analysis of sterilized foreign exchange interventions. Gabaix and Mag-
giori (2015) account for some of the long-standing empirical exchange rate puz-
zles by introducing nancial intermediaries that are willing to absorb international
saving imbalances for a premium, thereby deviating from the UIP. In another im-
portant contribution, Fanelli and Straub (2019) lay down the principles for foreign
exchange interventions. In their model, regulatory exposure limits and participa-
tion cost in the international nancial markets drive a wedge in the UIP. This paper
demonstrates that, to a rst order approximation, these models are equivalent to
a reduced-form portfolio adjustment cost model, as in Schmitt-Grohé and Uribe
(2003). Therefore, to the extent that one is only concerned with rst-order dynam-
ics and second moments, there is no gain from adopting the rich microstructure of
either models  a simple portfolio adjustment cost is just as good.
JEL classication: E58, F31, F41.
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1 Introduction
Breaking the uncovered interest rate parity (UIP) condition is essential to accounting for
the empirical behavior of exchange rates1, and it is a prerequisite in theoretical models for
the e¢cacy of sterilized foreign exchange intervention (FXI) through the portfolio balance
channel. While the inuential work of Backus and Kehoe (1989) points to the ine¢cacy of
sterilized FXIs, recent contributions have revived the argument for their use, e.g. Benes
et-al. (2015), Alla et-al. (2017), Cavallino (2019), and Fanelli and Straub (2019). These
models introduce nancial frictions that di¤erentiate domestic bonds from foreign ones,
otherwise, to a rst order approximation, the two assets are perfect substitutes, the UIP
holds and sterilized FXIs are deemed ine¤ective.
The contribution of Gabaix and Maggiori (2015), GM hereafter, sketches the micro-
foundations of a mechanism that introduces a wedge between home and foreign interest
rate di¤erential and expected exchange rate movement, thereby deviating from the UIP
condition. In their model, international nancial markets are segmented and nanciers
are willing to absorb saving imbalances for a premium, which in turn breaks the UIP. GM
forcefully demonstrate that their model can help rationalize some of the long-standing
empirical exchange rate puzzles, including the exchange rate disconnect and the forward
premium puzzles. In another important contribution, Fanelli and Straub (2019), FS
hereafter, lay down the principles for FXIs. The micro-foundations of the nancial friction
in their model rely on regulatory restrictions that are coupled with nancier-specic
participation cost in the international nancial markets, similar to Alvarez, Atkeson and
Kehoe (2009). In FS it is the participation cost of the marginal nancier that determines
the gap between interest rate di¤erential and the expected change in the exchange rate.
Due to the regulatory limits, movements in the foreign asset position of the economy
are associated with changes in the identity of the marginal nancier, and hence with the
marginal participation cost and the size of the deviation from the UIP.
This paper derives an equivalence result: to a rst-order approximation the GM and
FS models are identical to a standard reduced-form portfolio adjustment cost model, as in
1 See Engel (2014) and references therein.
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Schmitt-Grohé and Uribe (2003), SGU hereafter. In SGU the purpose of the friction is to
impose stationarity in small open economy models. They achieve it by endogenizing the
e¤ective foreign return faced by the agents in the small economy, as by assumption these
agents bear cost whenever their foreign asset position deviates from some benchmark
level. Since in GM and FS, as in SGU, movements in the foreign asset position generate
a time-varying wedge between the global risk-free rate and the e¤ective foreign return
faced by domestic agents, it is not surprising to nd that the UIP conditions in these
models are closely related. The simple modeling strategy of SGU is therefore robust to
di¤erent underlying micro structures. The implication of the equivalence result is that,
to the extent that one is only concerned with rst-order dynamics and second moments of
macro variables  as is typically the case in the open economy business cycle literature and
in many new-Keynesian models  there is no gain from adopting the rich micro-structure
of either GM or FS; a simple ad-hoc friction as in SGU is just as good. Moreover, the
underlying micro foundations of GM and FS do not carry into higher order terms in the
UIP condition, suggesting that the simplicity of the rst order approximation does not
sacrice important higher order dynamics.
The exposition of the models in this paper is deliberately lean, and they contain the
minimal structure needed for discussing deviations from the UIP. The models abstract
from production and use one global good, suggesting that the real exchange rate is xed at
unity. The nominal exchange rate reects the relative price of currencies, which are only
used as units of account in the home and foreign markets. Prices are exible, resulting
in neutral monetary policy. The models are focused on the specication of the nancial
frictions that generate deviations from the UIP, and although they are highly stylized
the resulting UIP conditions are robust to standard generalizations such as introducing
production, labor market and investment, multiple goods and nominal rigidities.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 presents the GM and FS
models alongside the simple portfolio adjustment cost model, adopted from SGU. Section
3 compares the log-linearized version of the models and derives the equivalence result.
Section 4 concludes.
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2 Three Models of Financial Frictions
This section examines three modeling alternatives for generating deviations from the
UIP: (1) the GM model, (2) the FS model, and (3) an ad-hoc portfolio adjustment cost
as in SGU. Before getting into the di¤erent models, their common features are described
below.
All models share the following basic structure. Consider a small open economy pop-
ulated by a unit mass of households, a government and a nancial sector. The economy
is perfectly integrated in the worlds goods market. There is one perishable good in the
world economy and two currencies, home and foreign. Each period, households in the
home economy are endowed with a random allocation of the good, Yt. The households
consume the good and trade it in the international markets. Consumption is denoted by
Ct. The foreign currency price of the good is P

t . Assuming the law of one price holds,
the domestic currency price of the good is Pt = StP

t , where St is the nominal exchange
rate (the price of foreign currency in terms of domestic currency). For simplicity assume
P t = 1, suggesting Pt = St.
Foreign bonds pay a risk-free gross return of Rt . In steady state foreign return equals
 1, where 0 <  < 1 is the subjective discount factor of both domestic agents and
foreigners. Foreign bonds are traded through the intermediation of the local nancial
sector. Domestic households own a fraction  of the nancial sector, where the rest is
held by foreigners.
The central bank issues domestic risk-free nominal bonds, BGt , and controls their
gross return, Rt. Only domestic agents hold domestic bonds.
2 The households holding
of the bonds is denoted by BHHt , the rest is be held by the local nancial sector. The
consolidated government (monetary and scal authorities) budget constraint is given by:
BGt = Rt 1B
G
t 1 + Tt (1)
where Tt is lump-sum transfers to the households.
2 Introducing exogenous external demand for home bonds, i.e. capital inow shocks, does not change
the results below.
4
2.1 Model 1: The GM Model
This section builds on Gabaix and Maggiori (2015). Households only hold domestic risk-
free bonds, as they do not have access to the international nancial markets. Financiers
absorb domestic saving imbalances for a premium.
2.1.1 Households
The representative household solves:
Max
fCt, BHHt g
1
t=0
E0
X1
t=0
tU (Ct)
s:t: StCt +B
HH
t  StYt +Rt 1B
HH
t 1 + Stt + Tt
where U () is a concave and strictly increasing periodical utility function. t is the
nanciers distributed dividends, denominated in foreign currency. The resulting Euler
equation is given by:
UC;t = RtEt

UC;t+1
t+1

(2)
where t+1 
St+1
St
2.1.2 Financiers
Agents are selected at random to operate the nancial rms for a single period. The
selection process is memoryless. Financiers start each period with no liabilities and a
net worth of B (denominated in foreign currency), which is held in foreign bonds. They
maintain this position through their dividend distribution policy. B is interpreted as the
nanciers preferred asset position, as they require a premium for deviating from it in
order to absorb excess domestic savings. GM set B to zero, but for sake of generality and
comparability with the portfolio adjustment cost model, I relax their assumption.3 Note
that since domestic households own a fraction  of the nancial rms, they only have a
claim to B of their net worth. Let b denote that quantity, i.e. b  B.
Let Qt denote the nanciers holdings of domestic bonds, which can be either positive
or negative. The absolute value of Qt reects the scale of nancial intermediation in
3 An alternative is to sacrice generality by maintaining the GM parameterization and imposing zero
steady-state net foreign asset position in the portfolio adjustment cost model.
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the economy. When domestic agents require excess resources, the nanciers borrow from
abroad in foreign currency and extend a loan of the same value in domestic currency to
domestic agents (Qt > 0). When domestic agents wish to save, they lend the nanciers
in domestic currency (Qt < 0) and the nanciers convert these funds into foreign bonds.
Given the initial balance sheet of the nanciers, they hold a net balance of Bt = B  
Qt
St
of foreign bonds, regardless of whether Qt is positive or negative. Let bt denote the home
agents claim on the base position plus the funds intermediated to foreign bonds, i.e.
bt = b 
Qt
St
. Notice that bt is the comparable quantity to the net foreign asset position in
the portfolio adjustment cost model presented below, as it measures in both models the
long run exposure of domestic agents to foreign assets plus their excess savings.
The nanciers pre-dividend domestic-currency value at the end of their one period
term is given by RtQt + St+1R

tBt, and they seek to maximize its expected discounted
value, which can be written as:
Vt =

1 
Rt
Rt
Et (t+1)

Qt + Et (St+1)
Rt
Rt
B (3)
Financiers are unable to perfectly commit to repay their creditors, and before the end
of period t, i.e. before St+1 is realized, they can divert a portion  
QtSt
 of their liabilities.
GM assume that   > 0 is an increasing function of the variance of the exchange rate,
which captures a limited capacity to take risk. They note that this assumption reects
the idea that the nanciers outside options are increasing in the size and volatility, or
complexity, of their balance sheet.
Since creditors correctly anticipate the incentives of the nanciers, the latter are
subject to a credit constraint of the form:
Vt  Et (St+1)
Rt
Rt
B +  
QtSt
 jQtj = Et (St+1) RtRtB +  Q
2
t
St
(4)
The nanciers problem is therefor to choose Qt so as to maximize Vt, as presented in
(3), subject to (4). Since the objective function is linear in Qt while the constraint is
convex, at the optimum the constraint always binds, and after using  Qt
St
= Bt   B, the
nanciers demand for foreign assets is given by:
Bt = B +
1
 

Rt
Rt
Et (t+1)  1

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As  ! 0 the UIP holds, i.e. Et (t+1)!
Rt
Rt
, and the nanciers can bear any exposure to
foreign assets. On the other hand, when  !1, they do not deviate from their preferred
position, and the the economy is essentially in nancial autarky as households cannot use
the international nancial markets to absorb excess domestic savings.
Using Bt   B = bt   b, and rearranging the condition above gives the modied UIP:
Et (t+1) =
Rt
Rt

1 +  
 
bt   b

(5)
Finally, for completeness, the nanciers distributed dividends are given by:
t =

Rt 1  
Rt 1
t
 
Bt 1   B

+
 
Rt 1   1

B
2.1.3 Market Clearing and the BOP
Market clearing in the nancial markets dictates:
BHHt +Qt = B
G
t
The balance of payments (BOP) identity is derived by consolidating the government
budget constraint, the households budget constraint and nanciers dividends together
with the market clearing condition above. After using the relation between Bt and bt,
Bt = bt + (1  )B and b = B, the BOP identity reads:
bt   bt 1 = Yt   Ct (6)
  (1  )

Rt 1  
Rt 1
t
 
bt 1   b

+
 
Rt 1   1

bt 1
The left-hand side is the nancial account, which equals the change in the net foreign
asset position of home agents. The right-hand side is the current account, which equals
net exports (rst line), minus dividend payment to foreigners against their intermediation
services (second line), plus interest income from abroad (third line).
2.1.4 Closing the Model
The Euler condition, equation (2), the modied UIP, equation (5), and the BOP, equation
(6), result in a system of 3 equations in 4 endogenous variables: Ct, Rt, t, and bt. Yt
and Rt are exogenous. The model is closed by specifying a policy rule for the nominal
interest rate, Rt.
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2.2 Model 2: The FS Model
This section builds on Fanelli and Straub (2019). The households problem in this model
is identical to that of GM, so I start with the description of the nanciers.
2.2.1 Financiers
A unit mass of nancial rms intermediate between domestic households and the inter-
national nancial markets. Financial rms face two restrictions: (1) net intermediated
funds by each rm cannot exceed some regulatory limit X, measured in foreign currency;
and (2) rms face idiosyncratic participation cost in the international nancial markets,
similar to the mechanism of Alvarez, Atkeson and Kehoe (2009). In particular, rm f
faces a cost of  (f) percent of its intermediated funds, where  (0) = 0 and  (f) is
continuously di¤erentiable with 0 (f) > 0.
Each period nanciers distribute dividends to their shareholders after incurring the
periodical participation cost.4 Their dividend distribution policy is to maintain their net
worth at B, where B is measured in foreign currency and is held in foreign bonds. Let
b  B denote the claim of domestic agents on the nanciers base position. In FS, B is
zero, but again, for sake of generality and comparability with the portfolio adjustment
cost model, a non-zero value is allowed.
Let Qft denote rm f holdings of domestic bonds, which can be either positive or
negative. Given the dividend distribution policy, nancier f holds Bft = B 
Qft
St
units of
foreign bonds. Let bft denote the home agents claim on the base position of rm f plus
the funds it intermediates to foreign bonds, i.e. bft = b 
Qft
St
.
Intermediary f optimally invests an amount Qft by maximizing the expected dis-
counted value of its portfolio subject to the regulatory constraint:
Max
 
Qft
St
2[ X;+X]

1 
Rt
Rt
Et (t+1)

Qft + Et (St+1)
Rt
Rt
B    (f) jQftj
4 FS write their model in continuous time, thereby avoiding the need to address the timing of dividend
payments. The assumption in the text, that dividends are paid after incurring the periodical participa-
tion cost, results in formulation similar to FS. Assuming alternatively, that dividends are distributed
before incurring the cost, does not a¤ect the results of this paper but makes the algebra a bit more
cumbersome. The derivation of the model under the alternative timing convention is available from
the author upon request.
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Since the objective function is linear in Qft, participating rms will take a foreign position
up to the limit of their regulatory constraint.
Participation is determined by comparing the marginal benet of investing in the
foreign nancial markets,
RtRtEt (t+1)  1
, to the marginal cost,  (f). Firm f policy
rule is thus:
 
Qft
St
=
8<
:
X  sign ( t) if  (f)  j tj
0 Otherwise
where  t 
Rt
Rt
Et (t+1)  1
That is, intermediary f will "go long" on foreign bonds up to the regulatory limit X if
RtEt (t+1) > Rt and will "go short" up to  X if R

tEt (t+1) < Rt, provided that the
expected excess return is larger than its marginal cost  (f). Firms with higher marginal
cost do not deviate from their initial foreign position B. The marginal active nancier,
f t, satises:

 
f t

= j tj ) f t = 
 1 (j tj)
Integrating the policy rule over all rms, using bt   b =  
R 1
0
Qft
St
df =  Qt
St
, and substi-
tuting for f t, gives:
bt   b = 
 1 (j tj)X  sign ( t) (7)
which is the modied UIP in this model. Notice that as X ! 0 rms have no access the
foreign nancial markets, jQtj ! 0, and the economy is e¤ectively in nancial autarky.
With no regulatory limits, i.e. as X !1, nanciers want to take innite foreign position
for any non-zero expected excess return in the currency market, driving  t to zero and
the UIP holds.
To illustrate the similarity of this model to the GM model, consider the special case
where  (f) = af . In this case f t =
1
a
j tj, and noting that  t = j tj  sign ( t), equation
(7) suggests:
Et (t+1) =
Rt
Rt
h
1 +
a
X
 
bt   b
i
Recalling equation (5), this case is therefore identical to the GM model with   = a=X. In
the GMmodel foreign asset positions are constrained by the ability of nanciers to absorb
9
risk, while here they are constrained by regulation and participation cost. We will see
that for a general  () equations (5) and (7) turn identical at rst-order approximation.5
Finally, for completeness, the nanciers aggregate distributed dividends are given by:
t =

Rt 1  
Rt 1
t
 
Bt 1   B

+
 
Rt 1   1

B  X  ( t)
where   ( t) 
Z f t= 1(j tj)
0
 (f) df ; Bt 
Z 1
0
Bftdf
Note that t depends on revenue from the portfolio of the previous period, net of current
period participation cost. This reects the assumption that the prots from the portfolio
of the previous period are distributed, so as to maintain a net worth of B, after incurring
the current period participation cost.
2.2.2 Market Clearing and the BOP
In the nancial markets:
BHHt +Qt = B
G
t
The BOP identity is derived by consolidating the government budget constraint, the
households budget constraint and nanciers distributed dividends together with the
market clearing condition above. The BOP identity in this model reads:
bt   bt 1 = Yt   Ct   X  ( t) (8)
  (1  )

Rt 1  
Rt 1
t
 
bt 1   b

+
 
Rt 1   1

bt 1
This is identical to the BOP under the GM model, equation (6), with the exception of
the presence of the share of the domestic economy in the aggregate participation cost,
X  ( t), as it represents a loss of real resources. Note however, that in steady state its
value and the value of its rst derivative are zero, and hence it drops out of the linearized
version of the model.6
5 Panel A in Table 1 presents equation (7) in log-linearized form. Note that the sign of bt   b in the
approximated equation is determined by the sign of eR
t
  eRt+Et (et+1). The details of the derivation
are presented in the appendix.
6 See details in the appendix.
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2.2.3 Closing the Model
Recall that the households problem is identical to the one in the GM model and hence
the Euler condition, equation (2), holds in the FS model as well. This, together with the
modied UIP, equation (7), and the BOP, equation (8), results in a system of 3 equations
in 4 endogenous variables: Ct, Rt, t, and bt. Yt and R

t are exogenous. The model is
closed by specifying a policy rule for the nominal interest rate, Rt.
2.3 Model 3: Portfolio Adjustment Cost
In this version, domestic households have access to the international nancial markets,
but they face a convex adjustment cost whenever the level of their foreign asset position
deviates from some long run target level, b, as in "model 3" of Schmitt-Grohé and Uribe
(2003). These costs may represent the cost of nancial services, and I assume that a
fraction  of the cost is rebated to the households.
2.3.1 Households
In this version the representative household solves:
Max
fCt, BHHt , btg
1
t=0
E0
X1
t=0
tU (Ct)
s:t:
StCt +B
HH
t + Stbt + St 
 
bt   b

 StYt +Rt 1B
HH
t 1 + StR

t 1bt 1 + Stt + Tt
where bt denotes the households net holding of foreign bonds, and  () is a convex cost
function (expressed in foreign currency) that satises:
 ()  0 ;  (0) = 0 ;  0 (0) = 0 ;  00 () > 0
t is the average adjustment cost in the economy and each household is rebated a portion
 of that cost. Since the rebate is a function of the economys average cost, households
do not internalize the e¤ect of their choice of bt on t.
The households optimality conditions are given by:
UC;t = RtEt

UC;t+1
t+1

(9)
UC;t

1 +  0
 
bt   b

= RtEt (UC;t+1) (10)
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Combining the two equations together gives the modied UIP:
RtEt

UC;t+1
t+1

1 +  0
 
bt   b

= RtEt (UC;t+1) (11)
2.3.2 Market Clearing and BOP
In the nancial markets:
BHHt = B
G
t
The BOP identity is derived by consolidating the government budget constraint and
the households budget constraint, while taking account that a portion  of the portfolio
adjustment cost is rebated to the households. The BOP equation reads:
bt = Yt   Ct +R

t 1bt 1   (1  ) 
 
bt   b

(12)
2.3.3 Closing the Model
The households optimality conditions, equations (9) and (11), together with the BOP,
equation (12), result in a system of 3 equations in 4 endogenous variables: Ct, Rt, t,
and bt. Yt and R

t are exogenous. The model is closed by specifying a policy rule for the
nominal interest rate, Rt.
3 Model Comparison
This section compares the models. The households Euler equation is identical across
models, see equations (2), and (9), while recall that (2) is common to both GM and FS
models. I will therefore only compare the modied UIP equations and the BOP identities.
3.1 First-Order UIP Equivalence
Panel A of Table 1 presents the modied UIP equation of each model after log-linearization,
equations (5), (7) and (11). In all models the deviation of the net foreign assets position
from its steady state, bt  b, drives a wedge between the expected depreciation of the do-
mestic currency and the economys interest rate di¤erential against the rest of the world.
The UIP relations may only di¤er in the coe¢cient multiplying bt   b, hence giving rise
to the following result.
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Table 1: First-Order Approximation of the UIP and BOP Equations*
Panel A: The Modied UIP
The GM Model: Et (et+1) = eRt   eRt +    bt   b   > 0
The FS Model: Et (et+1) = eRt   eRt + 0(0)X  bt   b 0(0)X > 0
Portfolio Adj. Cost: Et (et+1) = eRt   eRt +  00 (0)  bt   b  00 (0) > 0
Panel B: The BOP Identity
In all Models: bt   b = YsseYt   Css eCt + 1 b eRt 1 + 1  bt 1   b
where Css = Yss +
 
 1   1

b
* Tilde variables denote log-deviations from the deterministic steady state, i.e. eXt  log( XtXss ).
Result 1 (UIP Equivalence) If models are calibrated such that   = 
0(0)
X
=  00 (0)
then, to a rst-order approximation, they all generate identical UIP equations.
Gabaix and Maggiori (2015) have forcefully demonstrated that their theory can help
rationalize the empirical behavior of exchange rates, and provide a solution for the ex-
change rate disconnect and the forward premium puzzles. Fanelli and Straub (2019) use
their model to lay down important principles for FXI policy. Both theories are centered
around the imperfections in the nancial markets, as described above, and the wedge
they create in the UIP condition. In these models deviations from the long-run foreign
asset position are associated with excess expected return in one of the currencies. It
therefore comes at no surprise to nd that the UIP relation implied by these theories is
closely related to that of the ad-hoc portfolio adjustment cost model, as the latter simply
assume that excess returns are driven by movement in the foreign asset position.
When the coe¢cients governing the nancial frictions do not enter di¤erentially into
the models, as is the case here, it is impossible to distinguish between the underlying
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mechanisms generating the deviation from the UIP. Potentially, one could attempt cal-
ibrating the models using outside information regarding risk attitude ( ) or nancial
intermediation cost (0 and  00), but these would be unrelated to the moments generated
by the models. Standard calibration procedures that attempt to bring some second mo-
ments in the model close to their parallels in the data, would bring the coe¢cients across
models close to each other as required by Result 1. In that case the simple modeling
strategy is robust to di¤erent micro foundations, and there is no gain from committing
to a specic microstructure. The ad-hoc modeling strategy is just as good, at least to
rst order.
Nevertheless, several authors have emphasized the importance of higher order approx-
imation of DSGE models, cautioning against the implications of using linearized models,
e.g. Fernández-Villaverde et-al (2006), Amisano and Tristani (2010) and Lindé and Tra-
bandt (2019). It is therefore interesting to take a peek at what is dropped out when one
settles for a rst-order approximation. To that end, compare the excess foreign returns
in the GM and SGU models, as suggested by equations (5) and (11):7
Rt
Rt
Et (t+1) =
8><
>:
1 +  
 
bt   b

GM model
Et

UC;t+1
t+1

Et(t+1)
Et(UC;t+1)

1 +  0
 
bt   b

Portfolio adjustment cost
Note that the premium in the GM model is linear in bt, suggesting that a rst-order
approximation does not neglect any higher order terms that are generated by the nancial
friction. In contrast, under the portfolio adjustment cost model, there are two sources of
higher order uctuations: (1) the standard risk premium as captured by the covariance
of the marginal utility of consumption with the exchange rate (the Jensens inequality
term in front of the square brackets); and (2) the ad-hoc specication of the adjustment
cost function. If the cost function is quadratic, then the premium is linear in bt as in the
GM model. This comparison suggests that any higher order di¤erences emerging from
the modied UIPs are driven by nonlinearities of the adjustment cost model, rather than
7 Recall that with a linear participation cost the FS model generates identical UIP equation as the
GM model, hence the comparison below holds for the FS model as well. Clearly, under a nonlinear
specication for the participation cost, the FS model would generate higher order terms, but these
would be as ad-hoc as the specication of the adjustment cost in SGU.
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by missing important micro-founded dynamics captured by the GM model.8 This result
also works in favor of adopting the simple adjustment cost model.
3.2 First-Order BOP Equivalence
Panel B of Table 1 presents the approximated BOP identities of the models, equations
(6), (8) and (12).
Result 2 (BOP Equivalence) To a rst order-approximation, all models generate iden-
tical BOP equations.
Observing the BOP equations in exact form, before the approximation, it is clear that
they only di¤er in costs and dividends. However, these are second order. In particular, the
dividends from intermediation activity in the GM and FS models rely on the interaction
between di¤erentials in returns on foreign and home bonds, Rt 1 
Rt 1
t
, and the deviation
of the of the foreign asset position from its long run level, bt 1 b. Both are zero in steady
state, and therefore are washed away in the approximation. As for the costs, the portfolio
adjustment cost in SGU is second order simply by assuming  (0) =  0 (0) = 0, and the
details of the derivation for the participation cost in the FS model are presented in the
appendix.
4 Conclusion
This paper has demonstrated that, to a rst-order approximation, the micro-founded
models of GM and FS are equivalent to the simple reduced-form portfolio adjustment
cost model of SGU.
Importantly, the GM and FS models are centered around the micro structure that
generates deviations from the UIP condition; however, to a rst order approximation,
these end up identical to the deviations generated by a reduced-form portfolio adjustment
cost friction. Specically, in all models the linearized deviation is proportional to the
distance of the net foreign asset position of the economy from its long-run level. The
underlying mechanism driving this result is di¤erent across models. In GM, nanciers
8 Or by the FS model - see the previous footnote.
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are willing to absorb saving imbalances for a premium, and in FS nancial intermediation
is associated with participation cost which, in turn, drives a wedge between domestic and
foreign returns. As a result, in both models movement in the foreign asset position is
accompanied by movement in the e¤ective return on foreign assets faced by domestic
agents. The reduced-form portfolio adjustment cost model generates this result simply
by assumption. It therefore should come as no surprise to nd that the deviations from
the UIP in all models are closely related.
The implication of the equivalence result is that, to the extent that the economic
analysis is focused on rst-order dynamics and second moments  as is typically the case
in the open economy business cycle literature and in many new-Keynesian contributions 
there is no gain from adopting the rich micro-structure of either GM or FS, as the simple
and ad-hoc adjustment cost friction is robust to di¤erent underlying micro interpretations.
Moreover, the paper has also shown that higher order di¤erences in the UIP wedge are
driven by nonlinearities in the adjustment cost model, rather than by missing important
micro-founded dynamics captured by the GM or FS models.
In sum, it seems that adopting the simple modeling strategy of the adjustment cost
model comes with no cost in many economic applications, at least compared with the
two alternatives considered in this paper.
A Technical Appendix
This appendix provides details on the derivation of the log-linearized equations under the
FS model.
Recall the modied UIP equation under the FS model, equation (7). In order to avoid
the absolute value and the sign operator, this equation can be written as:
bt   b = 
 1 (j tj)X  sign ( t) =
8<
:
 1 ( t)X for  t  0
  1 (  t)X for  t < 0
(A.1)
where  t 
Rt
Rt
Et (t+1)  1
Notice that for   0:
@ 1 ( t)
@ t
=
1
0 ( t)
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and for  < 0:
@    1 (  t)
@ t
=
1
0 (  t)
Suggesting that at the steady state, i.e. at  ss = 0, the derivative of the expression on
the right hand side of (A.1) is continuous at zero and equals X
0(0)
. Therefore, a rst order
approximation of (A.1) results in:
bt   b =
1
0 (0)
X t
Using the denition of  t to substitute for its rst-order approximation gives:
Et (et+1) = eRt   eRt + 0 (0)X  bt   b (A.2)
where tilde variables to denote log-deviations from steady state. Equation (A.2) is the
second equation on Panel A of Table 1.
As for the BOP equation, equation (8), I only note that the aggregate participa-
tion cost, X  ( t), drops out under rst order approximation. Recall that   ( t) R f t= 1(j tj)
0
 (f) df ; hence, using the Leibniz rule:
@ 
@ t
( t) = 
 
 1 (j tj)
 @ 1 (j tj)
@ j tj
sign ( t) = j tj
1
0 (j tj)
sign ( t) =
 t
0 (j tj)
and since  ss = 0, the term X  ( t) is zeroed out under a rst order approximation, as
suggested by Panel B of Table 1.
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